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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050012-CA

vs.
KEITH MYLES SLATER,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an order revoking his probation after he pled guilty
to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6302 (2003); theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(2003); unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2003); and attempted escape
from official custody, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8309(a),(b) (2003), in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1. Does a trial court have jurisdiction, after it enters a final judgment, to
reduce the degree of the conviction and to resentence the defendant under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (West 2004)?
Standard of Review. The trial court's authority to reduce a conviction is
statutory. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. This issue thus involves a question of
statutory interpretation that this Court reviews for correctness. See State v. Gurr, 904
P.2d 238, 243 (Utah App. 1995).
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for
a section 402 reduction, where he violated the terms of his probation by fleeing
his drug treatment program after only two days and by committing three more
drug offenses?
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to reduce the degree of a
conviction is a sentencing issue that this court reviews for abuse of discretion. See
State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 31, 25 P.3d 985.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

This appeals concerns the application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (West
2004), attached as Addendum A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery, one count of theft,
one count of drug possession, and one count of attempted escape (R. 22,29-31). In
exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the charges in
another case and not to file any further vehicle theft-related charges for defendant's
conduct on November 15,2002 (R. 25). The court set sentencing for April 25,2003
(R. 23).
Two days before sentencing, defendant filed a motion under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-402 (West 2004) to reduce his aggravated robbery conviction to vehicle theft, a
second degree felony, and assault, a class B misdemeanor (R. 34-35). He asserted
that the elements of aggravated robbery were not met because he did not "use force
against the vehicle owner in an attempt to steal the vehicle" (R. 34) Rather,
defendant claimed, he used force to defend himself when "the vehicle's owner
entered the vehicle and grabbed [defendant]" (R. 34). Defendant added that even if
the elements did exist, a five-to-life prison term would be unduly harsh (R. 34-35).
The court continued sentencing to allow time to consider defendant's motion (R. 43).
The prosecutor responded that defendant's 402 motion was improper because
he had pled guilty (R. 51-52). He explained that the motion "undercuts the system
of plea-bargaining" and "deprives the State of the ability to introduce its evidence to

3

demonstrate . . . that the punishment is appropriate" (R. 52). The State offered
instead to stipulate to a motion to withdraw the plea (R. 52).
The Court denied the motion to reduce the conviction (R. 45). On August 15,
2003, it sentenced defendant to the statutory prison and jail terms for each offense
(R. 55). It then suspended each term and placed defendant on probation for thirtysix months (R. 55-58). The probation terms included serving a year in the county
jail and completing the Odyssey House in-patient drug program (R. 57-58).
Defendant did not appeal.
On December 4,2003, the court ordered defendant's release from jail to allow
him to commence treatment at the Odyssey House (R. 65). Less than two months
later, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") filed a violation report alleging that
defendant had failed to comply with several conditions of his probation (75-76). On
December 3, 2004, the court held a hearing on an order to show cause at which
defendant admitted to violating his probation by possessing and arranging the
distribution of drugs and by possessing a dangerous weapon (R. 95; 120:3-^1).
Defendant again moved for a 402 reduction of his aggravated robbery conviction to
a second degree felony (R. 93; 120:7). The court denied the motion, revoked
defendant's probation, and committed him to prison (R. 93-95; 120:97). Defendant
timely appealed his probation revocation to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 102-03).

4

That court transferred the case to this Court pursuant to the pour-over provisions of
Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(4) (West 2004) (R. 115-16).
STATEMENT OF FACTS*
Defendant was a daily methamphetamine user and owed several drug debts
(R. PSL2, 4). He decided that stealing cars would be an "eas[y] way to repay his
debts" (R. PSL2). Defendant intended to steal as many cars as he needed by stealing
one, driving it around until he found another, parking the first, and then stealing the
next (R. PSL4). His creditors would then help him backtrack and retrieve all the
stolen vehicles (R. PSL4).
Defendant stole Edgar Gonzales7 car from his driveway while it was warming
up unattended (R. PSL3). Edgar reported the theft to police and also mentioned that
a Dodge Spirit had been left near his home with the door open and the keys lying
nearby (R. PSL3). Police confirmed that the Dodge Spirit had also been reported
stolen (R. PSL3).
Defendant parked Edgar's car near the home of Jared McPherson where
defendant tried to steal Jared's car, which was also warming up unattended (R.

1

The facts are taken from defendant's presentence investigation report (PSI).
Defendant did not challenge the accuracy of any part of the PSI (R. 119:2). "If a
party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the
time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived/' Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1 (6)(b) (West 2004).
5

PSL3). As defendant was backing out of Jared's driveway, however, Jared saw him
and ran to the driver's side door of the car (R. PSL3). He opened the door and
grabbed defendant, who fought with Jared and struck him several times before
fleeing on foot (R. PSL3).
Police apprehended defendant a short distance away (R. PSL3). He had
several items on his person including a palm pilot, a cell phone, glasses, wallets, a
watch, cash, a knife, and some methamphetamine (R. PSL4). Police arrested
defendant and transported him to the sheriffs office in Taylorsville (R. PSL4).
While left alone in an interview room, defendant tried to escape by removing the
ceiling tiles and scrambling into the crawlspace (R. PSL4). Police ordered him to
stop, but he continued crawling until the ceiling collapsed, dropping him to the
floor (R. PSI:4).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant appeals a single issue: whether the court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to reduce his aggravated robbery conviction to a second degree
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). He did not, however, appeal his
conviction and sentence. Nor did he appeal the trial court's initial denial of his
motion. Rather, defendant appeals only from the court's order revoking his
probation over a year after the court entered the final judgment. This Court only

6

has jurisdiction, therefore, to consider issues related to the court's revocation of his
probation.
Defendant moved for a section 402 reduction at his probation revocation
hearing. However, a court may only reduce an offender's conviction under section
402(1) before or at the time it enters the final judgment. The trial court had no
jurisdiction to entertain defendant's motion; thus this Court has no jurisdiction to
review the trial court's denial of the motion.
Even if this Court did have jurisdiction to review defendant's claim, the claim
is meritless. The presentence report and diagnostic evaluation state that defendant
is a drug addict and a recidivist who is escalating his criminal behavior and
becoming more violent and more dangerous to society. The court did not, therefore,
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reduce his conviction.

7

ARGUMENT
THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW DEFENDANT'S
CLAIM BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TIMELY APPEAL HIS
CONVICTION

Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a section 402 reduction in his sentence. Br. App. at 12-16. Specifically,
he asserts that the trial court failed to "consider the circumstances of the offense and
[defendant's] character and history before denying his motion." Br. App. at 15.
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review defendant's claim because the claim
concerns defendant's conviction and sentence, which he did not appeal.
A. Defendant's appeal is limited to review of the trial court's
revocation of his probation.

Generally, a defendant who desires to appeal his conviction and sentence
must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the final judgment. See
Utah R. App. P. 3(a), 4(a). The sentencing order is usually the final order that
disposes of the case and starts the thirty-day window for appealing a conviction and
sentence. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT100, J 4,57 P.3d 1065; State v. Walker, 2002 UT
App 290,111, 55 P.3d 1165. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction over the case. See Bowers, 2002 UT 100, % 5 (noting
that thirty-day period for filing notice of appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be
enlarged by court); State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 1981) (same).

8

Post-judgment orders by the trial court do not resurrect a defendant's right to
appeal his underlying conviction and sentence, unless the order concerns a timely
motion under rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. For example, the Utah
Supreme Court held in State v. Garner, 2005 UT 6, J 17, 106 P.3d 729, that a
restitution order entered several months after the final judgment was "not a new
and final judgment for purposes of appealing the underlying merits of a criminal
conviction." Likewise, this Court has held that a revocation of a defendant's
probation does not renew the time to appeal the original judgment. See State v. Love,
2001 UT App 7 9 , 1 3 (unpublished memorandum decision), attached as Addendum
B.
Rather, appeals from non-rule 4(b) judgments are limited to review of that
particular judgment. Appeals from post-judgment orders are permitted by statute if
they concern an "order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(b) (West 2004). The right to appeal a
post-judgment order is distinct and separate, however, from a defendant's right to
appeal a "final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(a) (West 2004). For example, an appeal from a post-judgment
restitution order is limited to review only of the propriety of the restitution order.
See Garner, 2005 UT 6,117. Similarly, an appeal from a probation revocation order,
as in the instant case, is limited to examining the propriety of the probation
9

revocation, not the underlying conviction or sentence. Defendant may not use the
revocation order to reach back in time and resurrect issues relating to his conviction
and sentence. See Love, 2001 UT App 79, \ 3
Inasmuch as defendant appeals from a post-judgment order revoking his
probation, this Court only has jurisdiction to consider the denial of his section 402
motion if the trial court had jurisdiction at the probation revocation hearing to
entertain a section 402 motion. Cf. State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 681 (Utah App.
1991) (holding that since trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Montoya,
appellate court had no jurisdiction to review resentencing).
B. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reduce the degree of an
offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) once it enters a
valid final judgment.

Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1), a court may only
reduce the degree of the offense before it sentences the offender and enters a final
judgment. The statute does not authorize the court to amend an offender's
conviction and sentence after entry of the final judgment
A court's authority to reduce the degree of an offense is statutory, and the
scope and limits of that authority are thus a matter of statutory interpretation.
"When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's meaning by first looking to
the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the
language is ambiguous/' Blackner v. Dep't of Tramp., 2002 UT 44,112,48 P.3d 949.
10

The Court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by
the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State
v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25,4 P.3d 795. The Court reads the statutory language so as
"'to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful.'" State v. Maestas, 2002
UT 123, \ 52, 63 P.3d 621 (quoting Utah v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, \ 10, 44 P.3d
680) (emphasis and brackets in Maestas). Accordingly, "'effect must be given, if
possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute

No clause [,] sentence

or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction
can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.'" Id.
at \ 53 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction §46:06 (4th
ed. 1984)).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) states the following:
If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and
character of the defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by
statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative normally
applicable to that offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically
provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 2

2

Subsection (2) of the statute provides alternative conditions for reducing a
third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor. As defendant challenges his
conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, subsection (2) does not

apply.
11

Subsection (1) authorizes a court to reduce the classification of an offense by
one degree if the court concludes that the statutory degree is too harsh in light of the
offender's history and the circumstances of the crime. The last phrase in subsection
(1) states that the court may reduce the level of the offense and then "impose
sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402(1). The direction to "impose
sentence accordingly" suggests an intent by the legislature that courts only use
subsection (1) to reduce a conviction before sentencing.

That construction is

consistent with this Court's and the Utah Supreme Court's prior holdings regarding
the jurisdiction of a trial court after sentencing.
"Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction
over the case." State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,679 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v.
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, \ 10,84 P.3d 854. It may not thereafter revisit the case to
set aside or amend the sentence unless the sentence is illegal. See Utah R. Crim. P.
22(e) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time."); State v. Tinlayson, 2004 UT 10, \ 16,84 P.3d 1193 (concluding
that trial court had no jurisdiction to resentence Finlayson after remittitur of appeal
in which one of three convictions was reversed); State v. McGuire, 2005 UT App 13, \
5 (unpublished memorandum decision) (explaining that once a court imposes a
valid sentence, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to resentence the

12

defendant, and the appellate court has no authority to review any purported
resentencing), attached as Addendum C.
Construing subsection (1) to allow a court to reduce the classification of an
offense after sentencing would open the door for offenders to seek reclassification
and resentencing months or even years after the final judgment.

Such an

interpretation is inimical to the interests of finality in judicial proceedings, as well as
against the plain language of the statute. It would put the final judgment in limbo
leaving it forever open to possible reclassification and a new appeal based on the
denial of the reclassification. As shown by the plain language of the statue, the
legislature did not intend such a result.
Permitting courts to reduce the degree of a conviction only before entry of the
final order is also consistent with rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. That
rule states that motions to reduce a criminal offense must be filed at least ten days
before sentencing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(2).4

3

Courts may, however, revoke, modify, or extend probation within the
guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004). Where a prison
sentence has already been imposed but is suspended, revocation of probation is not
resentencing, but rather, execution of an already imposed sentence. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(iii) ("If the probation is revoked, the defendant shall be
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed").
4

The rule was amended on April 1,2005, to permit parties to file a motion to
reduce a third degree felony under section 402(2) anytime after sentencing.
13

Such a construction of subsection (1) is not only consistent with its plain
language and the rules and precedent of this Court, it is also good policy. A
reduction under subsection (1) requires the court to consider "the nature and
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty/7 Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-402(1). These are matters that the trial court must already consider in
imposing sentence. See State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 8,40 P.3d 626 (requiring trial
courts to consider all legally relevant factors in sentencing). They are also matters
that may be difficult to consider at a probation revocation hearing held months or
even years after the final judgment. This is particularly true in cases where the
defendant pleads guilty and there is little or no record of the details of the offense.
The State may lose track of victims and witnesses and may return or destroy
exhibits, all of which could be necessary to consider "the nature and circumstances
of the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1).
C. Because defendant raises no claim related to the revocation
of his probation, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his
appeal.

Defendant's only claim before this Court is that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to reduce the degree of his offense. Br. Aplt. at 13-16. He
appeals, however, from the court's order revoking his probation, which occurred
more than a year after the final judgment (R. 102). He does not challenge the basis
for the revocation. Although defendant moved for a section 402 reduction at the
14

probation revocation hearing, the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a
motion. See supra subpoint B. Inasmuch as the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion
and should dismiss the case. Cf. Montoya, 825 P.2d at 681 (holding that since trial
court's lacked jurisdiction to resentence Montoya, appellate court had no
jurisdiction to review resentencing). 5
D. Even if this Court had jurisdiction, defendant's claim is
meritless.
Even if this Court had jurisdiction to review defendant's claim, the claim is
meritless. The Utah Supreme Court has treated motions to reduce the degree of an
offense as a sentencing issue for which trial courts have wide discretion. See State v.
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 31, 25 P.3d 985. This Court must afford the trial court "wide
latitude and discretion in sentencing." State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah
1997). "[A] sentence imposed by the trial court should be overturned only when it
is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Id.
Defendant candidly acknowledges that "[t]here was evidence to support the
trial court's sentence." Br. Aplt. at 14. He refers to the PSI, which categorized him

5

The question of jurisdiction was not raised in the trial court. This Court
may, however, affirm a lower court on any ground apparent in the record. See State
v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, % 12, 994 P.2d 1278. Moreover, the issue of jurisdiction
may be raised at anytime. See Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679.
15

"in the high category of recidivism" (R. PSL2). The PSI also noted that defendant
has "a fairly extensive juvenile record," "had been fired from his job because of drug
use," had escalated his pattern of criminal behavior, and had become more violent
and "posed more danger to the community" (R. PSL2-3). Also, a diagnostic
evaluation conducted by the Department of Corrections diagnosed defendant with
Amphetamine and Cannabis Dependence and Antisocial Personality Disorder and
attributed to him "a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of
others" (R. Diagnostic Evaluation at 2).
A reduction was also not warranted because defendant had already received
a substantial amount of lenity. In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State
agreed to dismiss charges pending in another case and to not file charges relating to
defendant's crime spree on November 15,2005 (R. 25). The court also agreed to put
defendant on probation and allow him to enter the Odyssey House drug treatment
program (R. 57-58). Defendant stayed only two days at the Odyssey House,
however, and subsequently violated his probation by committing three more drug
offenses (R. 69; 120:3-^1, 6). Defendant's inability to maintain the conditions of his
probation provided ample justification for the court to refuse to reduce the level of
his conviction.
Despite the myriad of reasons not to reduce the degree of defendant's offense,
defendant claims the court imposed an unduly harsh sentence because defendant
16

"exhibited only reactive force" during the attempted robbery of Jared McPherson's
car. Br. Aplt. at 15. He asserts that the harsh sentence imposed for first degree
felonies should be reserved for "defendants who exhibit proactive force in
committing robberies." Br. Aplt. at 15.
Defendant's use of "reactive" rather than "proactive" force in stealing Jared
McPherson's car is not a reason to reduce the level of his offense, even absent the
mountain of evidence weighing against a reduction. When Jared moved to stop
defendant from stealing his car, defendant assaulted him and threatened to kill him
and his family (R. PSL7). The fact that defendant acted in response to Jared's actions
and not spontaneously does not mitigate his crime. Such a claim is akin to arguing
that a conviction for assaulting a police officer should be reduced because the
offender was only responding to the officer's attempt to arrest him. The robbery
was "aggravated" because defendant escalated the situation by assaulting the car's
owner rather the acknowledging that he was caught and cooperating by returning
the car.
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CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests the Court to dismiss defendant's appeal.
Defendant did not appeal his sentence and conviction, and the trial court did not
have jurisdiction at the probation revocation hearing, from which defendant now
appeals, to entertain his motion for a section 402 reduction. Therefore, this Court
likewise lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of that motion.
Respectfully submitted on this >Q

day of August 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the
appellate court in its decision making process/ 7 Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals,
2005 UT 18,110,110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between
the litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. ofCal, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560
(Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided
by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moreover, because the jurisdictional
issue raised by the State concerns a matter of first impression, the court should issue
its decision in a published opinion. See Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, % 14,44
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P.3d 734 ("A memorandum decision may not be used to render a decision in any
matter not clearly and unequivocally disposed of on the basis of well-established
Utah case law or Utah statute/ 7 ).
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this \ 0 day of August 2005,1 served four copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Keith Myles Slater,
by causing them to be delivered by hand to his counsel of record as follows:
Lori J. Seppi
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Addenda

Addendum A

§ 76—3—402. Conviction of lower degree of offense
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as
being for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the
defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may
unless otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for
the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to
be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor and
the sentence imposed is within*the limits provided by law for a class A
misdemeanor; or
(b)(i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney, and a
hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the interest of
justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees. In no case maty an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-402; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 6; Laws 1991, c. 7, § 1.
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file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of
jurisdiction over the appeal." Reisbeck v. HCA Health
Ser\>s.. 2000 UT 48, 1 5, 2 P.3d 447. Although the
notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of the
hearing on probation revocation, no final appealable
judgment has been entered containing the court's
ruling. An unsigned minute entry is not a final
appealable judgment. See, e.g., State v. Jimenez, 938
P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1997) (stating court has
consistently dismissed appeals from unsigned minute
entries); State v. Rawlinzs, 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah
Ct.App.1992) (concluding an unsigned minute entry
is not a final appealable judgment). Accordingly, we
lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal.

Before JACKSON, BENCH, and DAVIS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM.
*1 This case is before the court on a sua sponte
motion for summary dismissal. Appellant did not
respond.
Appellant seeks to appeal from his conviction
following a no contest plea to the offense of Stalking,
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1999). The trial court entered its
judgment and sentence on October 29, 1999.
Appellant did not seek to withdraw his no contest
plea and did not file a timely appeal from the
judgment or sentence. Following a hearing held on
August 16, 2000, the trial court revoked appellant's
probation, imposed a ten day jail sentence, and
reinstated probation for twelve months beginning on
that date. Although the docket contains a minute
entry reflecting the disposition, no signed judgment
has been entered in the trial court record. Appellant
filed a notice of appeal purportedly taken from the
original judgment and the probation revocation on
September 8, 2000.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Our
dismissal is without prejudice to a timely appeal filed
after entry of a signed judgment on the probation
revocation and reinstatement; however, our dismissal
is with prejudice to any appeal from the October 29,
1999 judgment.
2001 WL 311194 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 79
END OF DOCUMENT

We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
appeal. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal
within thirty days of entry of the October 29, 1999
judgment, as required by Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Contrary to the suggestion in
appellant's docketing statement, probation revocation
proceedings do not constitute a post-judgment motion
to amend the judgment that extends the time for
appeal from the original judgment under Rule 4(b) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. "Failure to
© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM:
*1 Shawn C. McGuire appeals the sentence entered
by the trial court. McGuire also appeals an order
denying a motion to reconsider the sentence.
McGuire pleaded guilty to operation of a clandestine
laboratory, a first degree felony under the
circumstances of this case. See Utah Code Ann. § §
58-37d-4(l)(a), -5 (2004 Supp.). On August 12,
2002, the trial court sentenced McGuire to an
indeterminate term of "not less than five years and
which may be life in the Utah State Prison." Rather
than file an appeal, on August 13, 2002, McGuire
filed a "motion to reconsider sentence." The motion
was denied on April 1, 2003, on the basis that there
were no grounds upon which to "reconsider" the
sentence, and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
reconsider a legally imposed sentence. McGuire
subsequently filed this appeal.
An appeal must be filed within thirty days from the
entry of a final judgment or order. See Utah R.App.
P. 4. In a criminal case, it is "the sentence itself
which constitutes a final judgment from which the
appellant has the right to appeal." State v. Bower,
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2002 UT 100, <f 4, 57 P.3d 1065. The "30- day
period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case
... is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this
[c]ourt." State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah
1981).
McGuire's notice of appeal was filed eight months
after entry of the sentence by the trial court, long past
the jurisdictional deadline. See Utah R.App. P. 4.
However, McGuire argues that the time for filing an
appeal was tolled in this case because McGuire filed
a "motion to reconsider sentence" the day after the
sentence was issued. fFNll
FN1. McGuire argues that the "motion to
reconsider" the sentence was actually a
motion to "alter or amend the judgment"
under rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, thereby tolling the time for
appeal under rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. See Utah R.App. P.
4(b). McGuire's attempt to categorize his
"motion to reconsider" the sentence as a
motion under rule 59 is unavailing because
rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifically applies to sentences.
See Utah R. Crim P. 22; Utah R. Civ. P.
81(e) ("These rules of procedure shall also
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings
where there is no other applicable statute or
rule...."). The fact that a remedy under rule
22(e) is extremely limited does not alter this
outcome.
Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses
subject matter jurisdiction over the case. State v.
Montova, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
However, rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides a mechanism by which a
defendant may attack "an illegal sentence, or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). McGuire sought
reconsideration of the sentence which was imposed
after his guilty plea was entered in this case. Giving
McGuire the benefit of the doubt, his motion to
reconsider his sentence may be construed as a motion
pursuant to rule 22(e). See Montova, 825 P.2d at 679.
The district court's jurisdiction over the resentencing
turns on whether the initial sentence was legal. Id.
(citing State v. Babbell, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah
1991)). Under Montoya, this court must "determine

© 2005 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in P.3d
2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 13
(Cite as: 2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.))
whether the initial sentence was valid. If it was valid,
the trial court would have had no further subject
matter jurisdiction to resentence [defendant].
Likewise, this court would have no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal." Id.
An illegal sentence under rule 22(e) must be
"patently" or "manifestly" illegal. State v.
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9,f 15, 84 P.3d 854. "A
'patently' or 'manifestly' illegal sentence generally
occurs in one of two situations: (1) where the
sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or (2) where the
sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range."
Id. McGuire's challenge to his sentence does not fall
under either situation. Instead, McGuire challenges
the decision of the trial court to deny probation and
sentence him to prison, a decision that is "within the
complete discretion of the trial court." State v.
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
As in Thorkelson, the error alleged by McGuire
involves an "ordinary or 'run-of-the-mill' error
regularly reviewed on appeal under rule 4(a) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Thorkelson,
2004 UT App 9 at f 15. TFN21 There is no showing
that there was anything illegal about McGuire's
sentence.
FN2. Moreover, there is no showing that the
trial court abused its discretion, let alone
entered an "illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner[.]" Utah
R.Crim. P. 22(e).
*2 Jurisdiction to resentence McGuire would require
an illegality in the initial sentence. Because the initial
sentence was legal, the district court lost subject
matter jurisdiction over the sentence. See Montoya,
825 P.2d at 680. Likewise, this court has no
jurisdiction. See id. Lacking jurisdiction, we are
required to dismiss the appeal. See Loffredo v. Holt,
2001 UT97.T 1 K 37 P.3d 1070.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
2005 WL 67585 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 13
END OF DOCUMENT
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